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ABSTRACT. In the history of international criminal justice, the in absentia trial has
always sparked some lively debates. Both the International Military Tribunals (IMTs)
in Nuremberg and Tokyo recognized the in absentia trial and in Nuremberg one ac-
cused was actually convicted in his absence. However, ideas on holding trials in the
absence of the accused have changed over time and international criminal tribunals
established after the IMTs adopted the opposite approach; i.e. they rejected the in
absentia trial as not being consistentwith the accused’s fair trial rights.Nonetheless, the
latest addition to the list of international criminal tribunals, the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, surprisingly reintroduced the concept of the in absentia trial as a means to
preclude suspects of international crimes to avoid justice. Moreover, recently there
have also been international cases in which the accused was absent from the pro-
ceedings against him; i.e. the accused refused to enter the courtroom as he did not
recognize the legitimacy of the court or requested permission not to attend the hearings
in light of his demanding responsibilities at home that are linked with his high level
position. The question what the concept of in absentia trials – both total and partial –
really entails andwhether, and if so how, in absentia trials are permitted in international
criminal law are the subject of discussion in this contribution.
I INTRODUCTION
In the history of international criminal justice, the concept of in absentia
trials has always sparked some lively debates. Both the International
Military Tribunals (IMTs) in Nuremberg and Tokyo recognized the in
absentia trial. The IMT inNuremberg, accordingly, sentenced one of its
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accused, Bormann, to death, while he was absent from the proceedings.
However, this permissive approach to the in absentia trial changed over
time and other international criminal tribunals since Nuremberg
adopted therefore the opposite approach; i.e. holding that an in absentia
trial is notbeing consistentwith theaccused’s fair trial rights and thusnot
allowed. Nonetheless, the latest addition to the list of international
criminal tribunals, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), reintro-
duced the concept of in absentia trials as a means to preclude suspects of
international crimes to avoid justice.
Before the other international criminal tribunals and courts, i.e. ICTY,
ICTR,SCSL,SPSC,ECCCandICC,1 theprohibitionof conductingan in
absentia trial did not put an end to the challenges either. Even when the
accused is under the control of the tribunal, some challenges may arise.
For example, accusedmaydisrupt theproceedings so that judgeswill have
to remove them from the courtroom. Some defendants may suﬀer from
bad health conditions and are therefore not able to attend the hearings.
Moreover, some defendants prefer to be absent from the ongoing hear-
ings. The International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) has been faced
with this latter situation, when Kenyatta and Ruto – the President and
DeputyPresidentofKenya, respectively, andbothaccusedbefore the ICC
– requested the Court that they would not have to attend the hearings in
their cases in light of their demanding duties that their positions demand.
The above mentioned diﬀerent approaches to the in absentia trial are
also reﬂected in the literature and in particular the adoption of the in
absentia trial by the STL puts this issue at the heart of academic atten-
tion. However, this contribution makes some valuable contributions to
the already existing literature. First of all, from a conceptual perspective,
this contribution provides further clariﬁcation on the notion of the in
absentia trial.Althoughaconceptualquestionshouldnormallyprecedea
normativequestion, this ﬁrst step is oftentimes taken for granted. Second
of all, recent developments that tookplace before the ICCwith respect to
the notionof in absentia trials havemostlybeenabsent fromanalyses and
are extensively discussed in this contribution.
Before going into further detail, some clariﬁcations on the term in
absentia trial’ are necessary. The term is not a straightforward and
subtle expression. As Jenks stated: the concept of in absentia
1 ICTY stands for ‘‘International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’’;
ICTR stands for ‘‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’’; SCSL stands for
Special Court for Sierra Leone’; SPSC stands for Special Panel for Serious Crimes
(East Timor)’; ECCC stands for Extra-ordinary Chambers in the Courts for Cam-
bodia’; ICC stands for International Criminal Court.’
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proceedings seems to mean diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people.’2 Both
components of the expression in absentia trial,’ namely in absentia’ and
trial,’ need therefore to be deﬁned and clariﬁed. Literally speaking, in
absentia’ means in the absence of.’ However, as Pons asserted in in-
ternational law, it is not yet entirely clear what the notion of absentia
really means and in what circumstances the accusedmay be considered
to have the legal status of absent’ from trial.’3
The word in absentia,’ in the context of an in absentia trial,’ refers
to a trial where the accused is absent or, in other words, is not pre-
sent. The standard to determine the presence or the absence of the
accused is his physical presence in the courtroom during a trial.4
However, as will be discussed later, an in absentia trial in its nor-
mative meaning refers to the prohibition of a trial in the absence of an
eﬀective defence, which is mostly accompanied with the physical
absence of the accused.
Moreover, theword trial,’ in the context of the in absentia trial, does
not carry one meaning only. Firstly, trial’ may refer to the criminal
proceedings as a whole, from its investigation phase to its sentencing
stage. In this context, the accused is convicted without his defence is
heard. In addition, the accused’s sentence remains pending due to his
absence. Secondly, theword trial’may refer to only a sessionorhearing
of the total proceedings. Therefore, the expression of in absentia trial’
includes two instances. In the ﬁrst place it can refer to a total in absentia
trial’ in which the accused is completely absent from the criminal
proceedings,which is also called trial bydefault.’5 In the secondplace it
can refer to apartial in absentia trial,’ where the accused is absent in one
or some speciﬁc hearings, while he is still under the control of the court
in order to undergo a sentence, if found guilty. Here, the reasons for the
absence of the accused can be various. The accusedmay waive his right
to be present at trial, may be removed from the courtroom due to his
disruptive behavior, or the health status of the accusedmay hamper his
presence in the courtroom.
2 C. Jenks, Notice Otherwise Given: Will in Absentia Trials at the Special Tri-
bunal For Lebanon Violate Human Rights?’, (2009) 33 Fordham International Law
Journal 56, 68.
3 N. Pons, Some Remarks on in Absentia Proceedings before the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon in Case of a State’s Failure or Refusal to Hand over the Accused’,
(2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1307, 1309.
4 Where, in this contribution, we refer to his’ we also refer to her.’
5 P. Gaeta, To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present)’, (2007) 5 Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice 1165, 1169.
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In spite of this conceptual distinction, the legal literature tends to
lump diﬀerent types of in absentia trials together and study them from
a normative perspective. This leads to some incoherence and
misunderstanding as to the phenomenon. This publication recog-
nizes, however, the above distinction of total and partial in absentia
trials and aims to answer whether total and partial in absentia trials
are prohibited or permitted in proceedings before international
criminal tribunals, and if permitted, under which circumstances. The
diverse approaches to the issue of in absentia trials that can be found
when studying the legal frameworks and practices of international
criminal tribunals – including the IMTs, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, SPSC,
ICC and STL – are addressed in this publication. The ﬁrst section
focuses on the total in absentia trials, the second section on the partial
in absentia trials, and ﬁnally, in the third section, our preliminary
conclusions on this topic are given.
II TOTAL IN ABSENTIA TRIALS
The total in absentia trial has a colorful history in the context of
international criminal proceedings. Although the prohibition of total
in absentia trials is largely agreed upon in proceedings before the
international criminal tribunals, it is interesting to note that the ﬁrst
and latest established tribunals – i.e. the IMT for Nuremberg and the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon – both adopted this mechanism as a
legitimate feature to fulﬁll their mandates.
2.1 Approaches by International Criminal Tribunals
In the following sub-paragraphs the diﬀerent approaches by interna-
tional criminal tribunals to the issue of total in absentia trials will be set
out, i.e. the IMTs, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, SPSC, ICC and the STL.
2.1.1 The IMT and the IMTFE
Despite the fact that the IMT in Nuremberg suﬀered from evident
drawbacks, the Tribunal proved to be the foundation of what has
now become modern international criminal justice.6 From the be-
ginning, the Allies – the USA, UK, France and Russia – adopted a
policy with respect to the selection of defendants to focus on those
6 R. Overy, The Nuremburg Trials: International Law in the Making?’ in P. Sands
(ed.), From Nuremburg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.
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suspects who were in the custody of the founding states (the Allies) of
the Tribunal already. The reason behind this policy was to preserve
the reputation and eﬀectiveness of the Tribunal. Such a policy served
the interests of the founding states to show their power and ability to
bring the defendants to justice. This policy was enshrined in a remark
made by the then Attorney-General of the UK, Sir Hartley Shaw-
cross, at a meeting in June 1945. He said that to draw up another list
of defendants: the test should be: Do we want the man for making a
success of our trial? If yes, we must have him.’7 The Allied powers
therefore only tried those individuals they knew they would be able to
get their hands on.
Despite this fact, the governing law of the Tribunal allowed for
total in absentia trials. Article 12 of the Nuremberg IMT Charter
stated that The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings
against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this
Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for
any reason, ﬁnds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct
the hearing in his absence.’ This provision is remarkable because it
was a departure from the legal tradition that had been adopted by
two founding states of the tribunal, namely the USA and the UK, as
common law system holders. Cassese pointed to the extreme gravity
of the crimes committed by the defendants of the Tribunal as a jus-
tiﬁcation for this departure.8 However, it seems that also another
justiﬁcation existed as total in absentia trials are considered to be a
feature of the civil law systems. The incorporation of a feature of civil
law into the law of the Nuremberg Tribunal was probably a com-
promise to overcome the discontent of another founding member,
namely France. As Overy asserted: French lawyers were unhappy
with a tribunal whose main basis was to be Anglo-Saxon common
law instead of Roman law, and whose procedures were foreign to
French legal practice.’9
Nevertheless, the possibility of having a total in absentia trial be-
fore the Nuremberg Tribunal was conditional. According to Rule
2(b) of the Rules of Procedure: any individual defendant not in
custody shall be informed of the indictment against him.’ Giving
notice to the suspect is a condition that is in common with national
systems that recognize a total in absentia trial as an applicable me-
7 Ibid., 8.
8 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
367.
9 Overy (n 6 above), 22.
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chanism. In these (civil law) jurisdictions it is believed that the ac-
cused at large waives his right to be present at trial if he has already
been informed about the ongoing proceedings against him and does
not appear in court.
In spite of the possibility of holding a total in absentia trial at the
Nuremberg Tribunal, this possibility was only once used, namely in
the case of Martin Bormann, the former head of the Nazi Party
Chancellery and Hitler’s private secretary.10 In this case, in compli-
ance with Rule 2(b), public notice about the upcoming trial was given
via newspapers and the radio in October and November 1945 to
notify Bormann of the proceedings against him.11 In addition, Ber-
gold was appointed as counsel for the accused. Bergold challenged
the in absentia trial of his client. His challenge was, however, not
based on the illegitimacy of the total in absentia trial; he instead
claimed that his client was already dead.12 However, the Tribunal
expressed in its Judgment, issued on 1 October 1946, that the evi-
dence of death is not conclusive and the tribunal, as previously stated,
is determined to try him in absentia. If Bormann is not dead and is
later apprehended, the Control Council for Germany may under
article 29 of the Charter, consider any facts in mitigation, and alter or
reduce his sentence, if deemed proper.’13 Bormann was convicted of
war crimes and crimes against humanity and ﬁnally sentenced to
death by hanging on 15 October 1946. He was, however, never found
and, as a result, his sentence remained outstanding. It was later dis-
covered that he was in all probability already dead while his trial was
ongoing.14
Finally, to be comprehensive, it should be noted that the Charter
of the IMT for the Far East (IMTFE or Tokyo Tribunal) did not
provide for any speciﬁc provision with respect to in absentia trials.
10 A. Klerks, Trials in Absentia in International Criminal Law (Tilburg University,
Master thesis, 2008), 18.
11 J. McGovern, Martin Bormann (New York: Littlehampton Book Services Ltd,
1968), 167–168.
12 For more information about the challenge posed by Bergold see: W. A. Sch-
abas, In Absentia Proceedings before International Criminal Courts’ in G. Sluiter
and S. Vasiliev (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of
Law (London: Cameron May Publishing, 2009), 339–342.
13 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major
War Criminals, Nuremberg, 30 September and 1 October 1946.
14 I. Karacs, DNA test closes book on mystery of Martin Bormann’, The Inde-
pendent, 4 May 1998.
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Klerks argues that since Article 9 of the Tokyo Tribunal’s Charter –
on the notion of a fair trial – did not include a right to be present at
trial, an in absentia trial was theoretically allowed before this Tri-
bunal.15 In any case, the Tribunal never made use of this possibility in
practice.
2.1.2 The ICTY and the ICTR
The Statutes of the ad hocTribunals – the ICTY and the ICTR – do not
embrace a provision that explicitly addresses the in absentia trial.
However, the right to be present at trial is enshrined in both Statutes, in
commonArticle 21(4)(d).According to this provision, the accused shall
be entitled to be tried in his presence, and to defendhimself in personor
through legal assistance of his own choosing.’ Therefore, it can be said
that total in absentia trials’ are not allowed at the ad hocTribunals. This
perception is consistent with the remarks of the then UN Security-
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his report of 3May 1993 to theUN
Security Council with respect to the ICTY. In this report he held that a
trial should not commence until the accused is physically present before
the International Tribunal. There is a widespread perception that trials
in absentia should not be provided for in the [ICTY] statute as this
would not be consistent with article 14 of the ICCPR.’16
Nonetheless, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of both
the ICTY and the ICTR provide for a procedure in case of failure to
execute a warrant of arrest, namelyRule 61. Sometimes, this procedure
is considered as an in absentia trial and as a compromise between the
diﬀerent views of the civil and common law systems with respect to in
absentia proceedings.17 However, it seems that the emergence of Rule
61 is not only the result of a compromise between diﬀerent legal and
theoretical perspectives, but that it was also created for its practical
necessity and advantages to ensure the eﬀective functioning of the
Tribunals. Contrary to the ICTY, however, no proceedings have ever
been conducted under Rule 61 before the ICTR.18
15 Klerks (n 10 above), 18.
16 The UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), (U.N. Doc. S/25704), 3 May
1993, para. 101.
17 W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambrideg:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 289.
18 B. Elberling, The Defendant in International Criminal Proceedings: Between
Law and Historiography (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2012), 48.
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What does a Rule 61 procedure entail? Rule 61 is not a trial proper;
instead it is a reconﬁrmation of the indictment. In thewords of the Trial
Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, when commenting on
common Rule 61 of the ICTY and ICTR RPE: it is a procedure in
absentia but not a trial in absentia.’19 Indeed, it is merely a pre-trial
mechanism and that is why Rule 61 does not allow for a determination
of the accused’s guilt.20 Rule 61 is applicable where the arrest warrant,
which was issued after the indictment was conﬁrmed by one judge, has
not been executed andwhere because of the non-execution of the arrest
warrant, the indictment has not been served to the accused.’ In such a
case, the Prosecutor shall satisfy the judge, who had already conﬁrmed
the indictment, that all reasonable steps have been taken to secure the
arrest of the accused and to ascertain his whereabouts, but that they
have not resulted in an arrest. Then, if the judge is satisﬁed, he shall
order the Prosecutor to submit the indictment to the Trial Chamber. In
this case, the Prosecutor submits the indictment and the collected evi-
dence in an open and public court.21 Afterwards, pursuant to Rule
61(d), the Trial Chamber will issue an international arrest warrant’
that will be transmitted to all states, if the Chamber determines that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed
the charges made against him.
Due to the publicity feature of the Rule 61 hearing, many beneﬁts
can be identiﬁed for this mechanism. It serves a pedagogic purpose in
the sense that it highlights the heinousness of the crimes committed
by the accused and the key role of the Tribunal to combat those
atrocities.22 In addition, such a mechanism gives great leverage to the
Tribunal to protect its reputation. It shows to the public that the
Tribunal, on behalf of the international community, is not passive; on
the contrary, that it is actively trying to administer justice. Former
ICTY Judge Sidhwa, in that light, mentioned that: Rule 61 is basi-
cally an apology for this Tribunal’s helplessness in not being able to
19 Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al, (Decision to Hold Trial In Absentia) STL-11/01/I/TC
(1 February 2012), para. 37.
20 C. Paulussen, Male Captus Bene Detentus: Surrendering Suspects to the Inter-
national Criminal Court (Antwerp – Oxford: Intersentia, 2010), 367.
21 K. Ambos and S. Bock, Procedural Regimes’ in L. Reydams, J. Wouters and C.
Ryngaert, (eds.), International Prosecutors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),
506.
22 L. Chand Vohrah, Pre-Trial Procedures and Practices’ in: G. Kirk McDonald
and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International
Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, Volume I (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 504.
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carry out its duties, because of the attitude of certain states that do not
want to arrest or surrender accused persons, or even to recognize or co-
operate with the Tribunal. In such circumstances, it is the International
Tribunal’s painful and regrettable duty to adopt the next eﬀective
procedure to inform the world, through open public hearings, of the
terrible crimes with which the accused is charged and the evidence
against the accused that would support his conviction at trial.’23 This
mechanism is also considered to be the voice of the victims.’24 Indeed,
the victims, through this procedure, are given an opportunity to speak
out and to give their testimony in open court, which may, for some,
contribute to their healing process.25One can say that for the victims, in
the context of international criminal justice, the process may be at least
as important as the result. Therefore, one of the most convincing
remedies for victimsof international crimes is that they can see that they
are listened to and that justice is done.26
To conclude, Rule 61 may be seen as a reasonable and pragmatic
compromise in the context of the ICTY and ICTR’s proceedings in
order to cope with the problem arising from the lack of control over
the accused, when an in absentia trial is not permitted.
2.1.3 The SCSL, SPSC and the ECCC
Hybrid or internationalized tribunals, such as the SCSL, SPSC and
the ECCC, have adopted a common policy with respect to in absentia
trials; in principle they do not accept total in absentia trials. However,
if the accused is initially present and then ﬂees or refuses to appear in
court, the procedural law of these Tribunals prescribes that the trial
will be carried out in the absence of the accused. This kind of in
absentia trials is very similar to total in absentia trials, because the
accused is absent at the sentencing stage of the proceedings. Rule
60(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the SCSL speciﬁcally
provides that an accused may be tried in his absence if: (i) the ac-
cused has made his initial appearance, has been aﬀorded the right to
appear at his own trial, but refuses so to do; or ii) the accused, having
made his initial appearance, is at large and refuses to appear in court.’
Subparagraph (b) adds In either case the accused may be represented
by counsel of his choice, or as directed by a Judge or Trial Chamber.
23 Prosecutor v. Rajic, (Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa, Rule 61 Decision) IT-
95-12-TC (13 September 1996), para. 7.
24 Ibid.
25 Klerks (n 10 above), 27.
26 Ibid.
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The matter may be permitted to proceed if the Judge or Trial
Chamber is satisﬁed that the accused has, expressly or impliedly
waived his right to be present.’ In the case of Augustine Gbao –
known as the Third Accused and prosecuted alongside Issa Hassan
and Morris Kallon – Gbao, following his initial appearance, refused
to attend the courtroom again, because he did not recognize the
legitimacy of the court. The Trial Chamber decided to proceed with
the ongoing trial against the accused as, by refusing to reappear in
court, he waived his right to be present. The Chamber in its decision
of 12 July 2004, mentioned though in essence trial in the absence of
an accused person is an extraordinary mode of trial, yet it is clearly
permissible and lawful in very limited circumstances.’27 It came to the
conclusion that this Court is satisﬁed that the Third Accused has
expressly waived his right to be present at his trial and this Court has
no other option but to permit the joint trial of all the three accused
persons to proceed in the absence of the Third Accused pursuant to
Rule 60(A)(i) of the Rules and it is so ordered.’28
Similarly, before the SPSC, Rule 5(2) of the Transitional Rules of
the Criminal Procedure, adopted by the UN Transitional Adminis-
tration in East Timor, allowed in absentia proceedings if the accused
was initially present and then ﬂed or was otherwise voluntarily ab-
sent.29 However, it seems that in absentia trials have not taken place
before the SPSC.
Similarly, Rule 81(4) of the Internal Rules of the ECCC embraces
the idea that in absentia trials are only allowed when, after the initial
appearance of the accused in court, the accused refuses or fails to
appear at or is expelled from subsequent court proceedings.30 With
respect to the ECCC, it is interesting to note that initially draft Rule
27 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, (Ruling on the
issue of the refusal of the Third Accused, Augustine Gbao, to attend hearings of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone on 7 July 2004 and succeeding days) SCSL-04-15-T
(12 July 2004), para. 8.
28 Ibid., para. 12(1).
29 Rule 5(2) reads as follows: If at any stage following the hearing provided in
Section 29.2 of the present regulation the accused ﬂees or is otherwise voluntarily
absent, the proceedings may continue until their conclusion.’
30 Rule 81(4) Internal Rules ECCC reads as follows: If the accused, following an
initial appearance and having been duly summoned to the subsequent hearing,
continues to refuse or fails to attend the proceedings, or is expelled from them in
accordance with these IRs, the proceedings may continue in his or her absence. In
such cases, the accused may be defended during the proceedings by his or her lawyer.
Where the accused refuses to choose a lawyer, the Chamber shall order that the
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79(1) proposed to prohibit inabsentia trials. This proposition was
welcomed by human rights NGOs that considered such a prohibition
in consistency with human rights norms.31 Nonetheless, in the ﬁnal
draft, Rule 81(1) stated that: 1. The accused shall be tried in his or
her presence, except as provided in this Rule.’
With respect to the ECCC case law, there is an interesting precedent
covering the issue of in absentia trials. One of the ECCC’s accused was
Ieng Sary, the then Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Aﬀairs in the
reign of Khmer Rouge. Following the collapse of the terror regime in
1979, he ﬂed to Thailand and was then convicted of genocide and
sentenced to death in absentia by the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal
(PRT) of Phnom Penh.32 After initiating the trial against Sary at the
ECCC, his co-lawyer challenged the jurisdiction of the ECCCdue to the
principle of ne bis in idem. Nonetheless, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber
rejected this argument and asserted, while it in itself had recognized in
absentia trials in its legal system, that the 1979 trial was not conducted
by an impartial and independent tribunal with regard to due process
requirements. Consequently, the prosecution, conviction, and sen-
tencing of Ieng Sary in 1979 by the PRT bar neither the jurisdiction of
the ECCC over Ieng Sary, nor any of the charges in the Closing Or-
der.’33With this statement it seems that the ECCCwanted tomake clear
that it did not recognize total in absentia trials when there is a problem
with the due process rights; it only recognizes in absentia trials, if upon
the accused’s initial appearance and having been duly summoned to the
subsequent hearing, he continues to refuse or fails to attend the pro-
ceedings, or is expelled from them, as prescribed in its legal framework.
It is said that in the above cases the principle of semel praesens
semper praesens,’ i.e. to be present at trial once, entails being present
forever, is upheld.34 In addition, some believe that in these circum-
stances, the infringement of the duty of the accused to attend trial
Footnote 30 continued
accused be represented by a lawyer and request the Defence Support Section to
assign him or her a lawyer, from the lists mentioned at Rule 11.’
31 See e.g.: Human Rights Watch, Letter to the Secretariat of the Rules and Pro-
cedure Committee, 18 November 2006; International Center for Transitional Justice,
Comments on Draft Internal Rules for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, November 2006.
32 Ieng Sary, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/ieng-sary.
33 Decision on Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against the Closing Order, 11 April 2011,
ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber (D427/1/30), para. 175.
34 Gaeta (n 5 above), 1167.
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must be sanctioned; therefore, the right of the accused to be present
at trial is temporarily suspended and the proceedings continue
without the defendant.35
2.1.4 The ICC
According to the legal framework of the permanent ICC total in
absentia trials are not recognized before this judicial institution. Ar-
ticle 63(1) of the Rome Statute indicates that the accused shall be
present during the trial.’36 This provision is reaﬃrmed in Article
67(1)(d) of the Rome Statute – concerning the rights of the accused –
promulgating that the accused has a right subject to article 63,
paragraph 2, to be present at the trial.’ Although trials in the archi-
tecture of the Court should be conducted in the presence of the ac-
cused, there is nevertheless a quasi-trial that can be held in the
absence of the accused, namely the conﬁrmation of charges hearing,
that needs to be given attention here.
According to Article 61 of the Rome Statute, the hearing for
conﬁrmation of the charges before trial’ should be held by the Pre-
Trial Chamber within a reasonable time after the person’s surrender
or voluntary appearance before the court.’37 This mechanism re-
sembles, to some extent, the Rule 61 mechanism at the ICTY and
ICTR and is a procedure that, as a compromise, again combines
several elements of diﬀerent legal systems.38
In the normal course of events, the hearing shall be held in the
presence of the person charged, as well as his or her counsel.’39
However, there is a remarkable feature to be found in Article 61 of
the Rome Statute, and that is, according to Article 61(2), that the Pre-
Trial Chamber may hold the conﬁrmation hearing in the absence of
the person charged upon the request of the Prosecutor or on its own
motion.40 Such an ex-parte hearing will be justiﬁed where the accused
35 See e.g.: Pons (n 3 above), 1308.
36 The person charged is called the accused’ or the defendant’ at trial.
37 Art. 61(1) Rome Statute.
38 J. Dong, Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court: A
Comparative Study’, (2009) 2 Journal of Politics and Law 109, 110.
39 Art. 61(1) Rome Statute.
40 It must be noted that in the case of Ruto’s request for excusal, the Prosecutor
adduced to Articles 63(2) (the removal of the disruptive accused) and 61(2)(a) (the
conﬁrmation hearing in absentia) to prove that they are the only accepted exceptions
to the rule of the necessity of the presence of the accused at the courtroom. However,
as Chamber V(a) correctly submits in its decision on the case, the idea that a positive
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has waived his right to be present, has ﬂed or cannot be found. The
Prosecutor of the Court suggested that the adoption of Article
61(2)(a) helped to resolve disputes about Article 63(1) – which calls
for the presence of the accused – by making a compromise, during the
drafting stage of the Rome Statute, with those delegations that were
in favor of in absentia trials.41 According to Rule 124(1) of the RPE:
If the person concerned is available to the Court but wishes to waive
the right to be present at the hearing on conﬁrmation of charges, he
or she shall submit a written request to the Pre-Trial Chamber, which
may then hold consultations with the Prosecutor and the person
concerned, assisted or represented by his or her counsel.’ For in-
stance, Katanga waived his right to be present at the conﬁrmation
hearing and requested several times to be granted absence from the
conﬁrmation hearing.42 When the accused waives his right to be
present, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be satisﬁed that the person
seeking the absence from the hearing understands the right to be
present and the consequences of his absence.43 It falls within the
discretionary power of the Chamber to determine whether or not it
gives eﬀect to the waiver. Therefore, if the person concerned is
available to the Court and the Chamber decides not to hold a hearing
in his absence, it shall order the person to appear.’44
If the person charged is not available to the Court and is at large,
the Chamber has to satisfy itself that all reasonable steps have been
taken: i) to secure the person’s appearance, ii) to inform him or her of
the charges and also of the fact that such a conﬁrmation hearing is to
be held in absentia. In this situation, such a deliberate absence with
Footnote 40 continued
provision raises a negative implication, namely exclusion of other things not ex-
pressly accounted for in the positive provision, expressed in the Latin maxim ex-
pression unius est exclusion alterius, is not applicable. In fact, this doctrine is
weakend because, as mentioned before, a law is not able to predict everything.
Hence, its positive provisions do not imply the exclusion of other possibilities.
See:Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, (Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from
Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-01/09-01/11 (18 June 2013), paras. 54–63.
41 Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, (Prosecution Appeal Against the Decision on Mr.
Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-01/09-01/11 (29
July 2013), para. 15.
42 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, (Mr Katanga’s waiver of his right to be present
at the Conﬁrmation Hearing pursuant to Rule 124 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence) ICC-01-04-01/07 (9 July 2008).
43 Rule 124(2) ICC RPE.
44 Rule 125(4) ICC RPE.
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knowledge of a coming hearing may be considered as an indication of
a waiver of the right to be present. Moreover, the Rome Statute
provides for another guarantee in the case of in absentia hearings and
that is that the person shall be represented by counsel where the Pre-
Trial Chamber determines that it is in the interest of justice.’45 If the
person who has ﬂed, subsequently, is arrested, there is no right to a
retrial,’ but the person charged shall be committed to the Trial
Chamber established under article 61, paragraph 11.’ In this case, the
person charged may request in writing that the Trial Chamber refer
issues to the Pre-Trial Chamber that are necessary for the Chamber’s
eﬀective and fair functioning.’46
It is true that the conﬁrmation of charges hearing is not a real trial;
only the charges are conﬁrmed at this pre-trial stage and no convic-
tion of the accused can result without his presence. In spite of these
considerations, the in absentia conﬁrmation of charges hearing, like
the Rule 61 mechanism before the ICTY and ICTR, can be seen as a
mechanism which maintains a good balance between diﬀerent inter-
ests at stake in international criminal proceedings before the Court.
The existence of such a mechanism entails that the Court does not
have to hold total in absentia trials proper, a path followed by the
STL, as discussed next.
2.1.5 The STL
The STL, that was established controversially, also introduced a
controversial mechanism, namely the total in absentia trial.47 As
Cassese pointed out, the incorporation of this typical feature of the
civil law procedure into the STL scheme had been motivated by the
inﬂuence of the system prevailing in the internal legal system of Le-
banon, based on the civil law tradition.48 This is exactly what was
mentioned by the then UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan, when he
noted that the constituent instruments of the UN based tribunals had
included more common law elements, but [that] the Lebanon tribunal
was the ﬁrst to draw substantially on civil law traditions, and the
45 Art. 61(2) Rome Statute.
46 Rule 126(3) ICC RPE.
47 For a critical analysis of the legality of the STL, see: B. Fassbender, Reﬂection
on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, (2007) 5 Journal
of International Criminal Justice 1091.
48 Cassese (n 8 above), 374.
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introduction of in absentia trials was the most notable manifestations
of civil law elements.’49 So, the STL, as the most recent established
international criminal tribunal, and the IMT at Nuremberg, as the
ﬁrst ever established international criminal tribunal, both explicitly
accept(ed) the possibility of conducting in absentia trials. However,
unlike the Nuremberg IMT in particular, the STL provides a string of
conditions to ensure that such a trial is fair and respects the rights of
the accused, in particular by including the accused’s right to a retri-
al.50
Article 16(4)(d) of the STL Statute provides that the accused has
the guarantee to be tried in his presence. Nonetheless, Article 22 of
the STL Statute makes clear that a trial proceeding in the absence of
the accused is possible, but shall’ be conducted under speciﬁc con-
ditions. These conditions are met in three situations, namely when the
accused: (a) has expressly and in writing waived his or her right to be
present or (b) has not been handed over to the Tribunal by the state
authorities concerned or (c) has absconded or otherwise cannot be
found and all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her
appearance before the Tribunal and also to inform him or her of the
charges.’ The motivation for the provision of trials in absentia in
Article 22 was to address the possible refusal by Syria to hand over
suspected persons to the Tribunal.51 For this purpose, Article
22(b) was considered as a solution to cope with this problem, par-
ticularly when there is no legal obligation upon other states to co-
operate with the STL to enable the court to try persons of another
nationality.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Koﬁ Annan, stated,
in his remarks on the establishment of the Lebanon Tribunal, that the
inclusion of a provision on trials in absentia could be crucial to
ensure that the legal process would not be unduly delayed because of
the absence of the accused.’52 Article 22 has, therefore, adopted a
49 UN Secretary-General, Report on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, (S/2006/896), 15 November 2006, para 32.
50 Gaeta (n 5 above), 1166.
51 W. Jordash and T. Parker, Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for Le-
banon’, (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 507.
52 UN Secretary-General (n 72 above). The interesting point is that this statement
is in contradiction with the previously stated policy of the Secretary-General in his
report to the Security Council at the time of the creation of the ICTY, that is A trial
should not commence until the accused is physically present before the International
Tribunal’ (Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para. 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, 101).
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certain terminology, which shows that holding trials in absentia is not
merely permitted but is even mandatory.53 Rule 105bis(a) of the STL
Statute establishes a temporal framework to implement this duty.
According to this rule, the Pre-Trial Judge shall ask the Trial
Chamber to initiate proceedings, if within a period of 30 calendar
days starting from the advertisement referred to in Rule 76bis, the
accused is not under the Tribunal’s authority.54 The indictment
against the accused should be advertised to satisfy the requirement set
by Article 22(2)(a) of the Statute that asserts: When hearings are
conducted in the absence of the accused, the Special Tribunal shall
ensure that: The accused has been notiﬁed, or served with the in-
dictment, or notice has otherwise been given of the indictment
through publication in the media or communication to the State of
residence or nationality.’ There is another obligation imposed upon
the STL before starting an in absentia trial; the Court shall ensure
that the accused is supported and assisted by counsel, either an ap-
pointed counsel or elected one.55
It has been stated by many that the use of the in absentia trial by
the STL represents a departure from the practice of other interna-
tional criminal tribunals.56 Although some scholars defend the exis-
tence of an in absentia trial before the STL and consider it as the
reﬂector of the aim of the drafters to elaborate a more eﬃcient
international criminal procedure,’57 this deviation from the overall
53 Jordash and Parker (n 51 above), 495.
54 Rule 76bis: In keeping with the President’s order made under Rule 76(E), a
form of advertisement shall be transmitted by the Registrar to the authorities of any
relevant State or entity for publication in newspapers and/or for broadcast via radio,
television and/or other media, including the internet, providing notiﬁcation to the
public of the existence of an indictment and calling upon the accused to surrender to
the Tribunal or in any case to submit to its jurisdiction. The advertisement shall
invite any person with information as to the whereabouts of the accused to com-
municate that information to the Tribunal.’
55 According to Article 22(2), the Tribunal shall ensure that: The accused has
designated a defense counsel of his or her own choosing, to be remunerated either by
the accused or, if the accused is proved to be indigent, by the Tribunal;(c) Whenever
the accused refuses or fails to appoint a defense counsel, such counsel has been
assigned by the Defense Oﬃce of the Tribunal with a view to ensuring full repre-
sentation of the interests and rights of the accused.’
56 E.g. R. Riachy, Trial in Absentia in the Lebanese Judicial System and at the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Challenge or Evolution?’, (2010) 8 Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice 1305.
57 E.g. C. Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon’, (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1123. See also generally:
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practice has also provoked heavy and widespread criticism. For in-
stance, Jalloh has explicitly held that the STL provision is a violation
of human rights norms.58 It seems that such constant criticism caused
Schabas to mention that in absentia proceedings at the STL would
not be exercised in practice, in the same way that the prosecution of
persons aged 15 at the SCSL have never been materialized due to its
controversial nature, though it was accepted by the legal framework
of the SCSL.59 Nonetheless, this prediction did not hold true.
On 1 February 2012, the Trial Chamber of the STL, in accordance
with Rule 106, decided to try four accused in absentia, namely Sallim
Ayyash, Mustafa Badreddin, Hussein Onneisi and Asad Sadra.60 The
Trial Chamber came to this decision while it acknowledged that a
trial in an accused’s presence is preferable, even in the particular
circumstances of this case, and agrees with the President’s statement
in his Rule 76 Order that it is in the best interests not only of the
accused, but also of the Tribunal – with its purpose of achieving a fair
and eﬃcient trial to establish truth and promote reconciliation within
Lebanon – for each accused to be present and to fully participate in
his own defence.’61 Yet, the Chamber did not consider the legitimacy
of an in absentia trial and exclusively assessed the legal and statutory
requirements of conducting an in absentia trial, i.e. the ﬁrst is that the
Trial Chamber must be satisﬁed that an accused has absconded or
cannot be found. The second is that all reasonable steps have been
taken to secure the appearance of the accused before the Tribunal.
The third, concurrent with the second, is that all reasonable steps
have been taken to inform the accused of the charges in the indict-
ment.’62 Finally, since the Trial Chamber stated in its decision that a
trial in absentia obviously cannot await the arrest of an accused, as
this would defeat the rationale of the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules.’63
Footnote 57 continued
C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), 119–125.
58 C. Chernor Jalloh, Self-representation and the Use of Assigned, Standby and
Amicus Counsel’ in L. Carter and F. Pocar, (eds.), International Criminal Procedure:
The Interface of Civil Law and Common Law Legal System (London: Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, 2013), 155.
59 Schabas (n 12 above), 378.
60 Decision to Hold Trial In Absentia (n 19 above), 47.
61 Ibid., para. 20.
62 Ibid., para. 27.
63 Ibid., para. 41.
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Then, on 16 January 2014, the in absentia trial at the STL started,
dealing with the Ayyash et al. case.
2.2 Appraisal of Total In Absentia Trials
As mentioned earlier, total in absentia trials were explicitly allowed
before the IMT in Nuremberg and are nowadays accepted before the
STL. No other international criminal tribunals have allowed this
possibility. Only when the accused initially appeared in court and
subsequently ﬂed, refused or was otherwise unavailable, some inter-
national criminal tribunals have allowed the proceedings to go ahead
without the presence of the accused in the courtroom.
We now turn to the question whether total in absentia trials can
objectively be considered legitimate. This can be assessed from two
distinct perspectives: the practical and theoretical perspective. The
former perspective considers the practical consequences of an action
and its desirability and underlying values; the latter perspective fo-
cuses mostly on whether the process is consistent with some relevant
objective norms and beliefs.64
2.2.1 The Practical Perspective
As mentioned before, a total in absentia trial refers to a situation in
which the judicial system lacks control of the accused, because the
accused is at large. This situation does not include a case where the
accused is absent, because he has waived his right to be present, while
a court still has the power to force him to be present. Pragmatism
focuses on the practical consequences of a conduct or mechanism to
assess if such a mechanism is right or wrong.65 From this rather
pragmatic perspective, in the context of international criminal pro-
ceedings, a total in absentia trial is not useful and does not have
signiﬁcant practical results. The overriding goal that underlies crim-
inal proceedings is punishing the defendant for wrongful conduct.66
64 For more information about practical versus theoretical reasons see: entry of
Standford Encyclopedia at (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/).
These two distinct perspectives are – to a large extent – similar to the so-called
deontological and teleological perspectives, respectively.
65 See e.g.: Entry of Pragmatism in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/#PraPra).
66 See e.g.: J. D. Ohlin, Goals of International Criminal Justice and International
Criminal Procedure’, in: G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S. Vasiliev and S. Zappala,
International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013), pp. 55–68.
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However, this is not to say that the content of the punishment –
whether it is deterrence or retribution for instance – is not important.
Punishment is a subject-oriented notion and should be imposed upon
a person. When the convicted person is not present to undergo the
punishment, the question may be raised what the usefulness of a
conviction entails. As the law should in principle be administrated, it
can be held that a conviction without administration is on its face
valueless.
The legitimacy of an in absentia trial as adopted by the STL can
also be assessed here. From a practical perspective, such a trial is
valueless as the existence of in absentia trials at the STL is subject to
another measure to protect the rights of the accused, namely the right
to retrial.’ Article 22(3) of the STL Statute states that in case of
conviction in absentia, the accused, if he or she had not designated a
defense counsel of his or her choosing, shall have the right to be
retried in his or her presence before the Special Tribunal, unless he or
she accepts the judgment.’ A sentence without possibility to be en-
forced may be seen by the public as a weak feature of the STL and
this will not be beneﬁcial to the legacy of the STL.67 Justice to vic-
tims, on the other hand, may be considered to be a valid reason to
justify total in absentia trials, as justice to victims can be considered as
one of the goals of international criminal justice also.68 However, in
the absence of any (empirical) research on this with regard to the
STL, being the only modern international criminal tribunal allowing
total in absentia trials, it is unclear whether victims of international
crimes themselves believe that the in absentia trial at the STL is
beneﬁcial to them.69 As mentioned before, all advantages, including
67 Klerks (n 10 above), 68.
68 See e.g.: A-M de Brouwer and M. Heikkila¨, Victim Issues: Participation,
Protection, Reparation, and Assistance’, in: G. Sluiter, H. Friman, S. Linton, S.
Vasiliev and S. Zappala, International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1368–1370.
69 For some discussion on this point, see: M. Gardner, Reconsidering Trials In
Absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: An Application of the Tribunal’s
Early Jurisprudence’, (2011) 43 George Washington International Law Review 134
(where mention is made that international criminal trials in absentia could lead to a
loss of credibility for the court and disappointment for the victims), 135 (Thus trials
in absentia can provide at least partial justice from a societal perspective, even if they
fall short of full vindication and closure for victims’). See also for those in favour of
in absentia trials as it may oﬀer justice to victims: Al-Monitor, Special Tribunal
Moves Toward Trial In Absentia, 18 December 2012 (Sir David Baragwanath
(President of the STL): The problem with not having trial in absentia is that if an
accused manages to hide, the community do not have the facts of the case presented
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those for victims that are imaginable for an in absentia trial can
possibly be better realized by some pre-trial mechanisms such as Rule
61 at the ICTY or the Article 61 conﬁrmation of charges hearing at
the ICC. It does not necessarily need to hold a full trial.
The pointlessness of having in absentia trials has another reason.
According to human rights norms, an in absentia trial should be
accompanied with the possibility of a retrial’ for the mechanism to be
considered fair. This means that the accused has the right to appear in
court at any moment and request that proceedings be commenced
again, even if he has already been convicted in absentia.70 So, from
the perspective of judicial economy, conducting a trial in the absence
of the accused that is subject to retrial’ is not economical and rea-
sonable and can be seen as a waste of time and money. The admin-
istration of justice in the international sphere considerably increases
the costs. The STL is a good example here. The approved budget for
this tribunal for each year amounts to nearly 60,000,000 Euros and to
date, the tribunal has cost an estimated 500,000,000 US Dollars in
total.71 Conducting an in absentia trial that is subject to retrial is thus
an expensive way to seek justice. Upon the presence of the accused, a
retrial can highly increase the costs. So, from a rational perspective,
the in absentia trial is not easily justiﬁed, simply because its cost
prevail its beneﬁts. Maybe due to these facts, the STL itself explicitly
admitted that there is one aspect of these proceedings that should not
Footnote 69 continued
formally before the court and contested by the defence counsel in the way that can
happen with a trial in absentia. And that can mean, particularly for victims, that
what they have experienced; the agony of either personal injury or loss of a loved
one, does not encounter the court analysis that the trial does. And since trial in
absentia permits that, it serves the interest of the victims and the members of the
community where the events have taken place. There is of course an expense but
that’s a cost that has been accepted as payable under our statute.’; C. K. Benedik,
Trials in Absentia, International Criminal Law, and the Modern Human Rights




70 The European Court of Human Rights rules in para. 87 of its Judgment of 13
February 2012 in the case of Krombach v. France, No: 29731/96, that: the authorities
have a positive obligation to aﬀord the accused the opportunity to have a complete
rehearing of the case in her or her presence.’
71 See: Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Sixth Annual Report (2014–2015), p. 27; A.
Taylor, The U.N.’s tribunal in Lebanon has cost millions and made no arrests. Now
the journalists are on trial, The Washington Post, 7 April 2015.
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be forgotten: a trial in absentia is only the second best option in the
circumstances.’72
However, the prohibition of total in absentia trials does not
hamper justice. When the accused ﬂees, it does not put an end to the
proceedings against him. The court can take some measures to pro-
tect other interest; for instance the assets of the accused can be seized;
the victims can be heard in a quasi-trial hearing, like the conﬁrmation
of charges hearing before the ICC or the Rule 61 mechanism in the
ICTY/ICTR; or an arrest warrant or a travel ban can be imposed
upon the accused to limit his movement. Indeed, a distinction should
be drawn between the investigative stage and trial phase. An inves-
tigation could be initiated in the absence of a suspect. As the Supreme
Court of Appeal of South Africa held in its decision of November
2012, there is no reason why an investigation should not be initiated,
provided there is a prospect of a perpetrator’s presence.73 By such a
distinction, a balance can be maintained between all parties to a
criminal case. The voice of the victims could be heard through the
commencement of an investigation and the public is also informed
that justice is being done; therefore, the reputation of the judicial
system can be preserved. Nonetheless, it is not reasonable to autho-
rize a court to bring a case to an end and convict the accused when he
is not under the court’s control.
In contrast with the approach that is adopted by some interna-
tionalized tribunals (see section 2.1.3), it must be said that if the
accused upon his initial appearance ﬂees, it does not change the
circumstances to justify an in absentia trial. Fleeing is a crime inde-
pendently, but it must not be punished by prescribing an in absentia
trial. It could be sanctioned by an extra punishment when the accused
is arrested. The integrity and coherency of the criminal proceedings
should be preserved and defended. A total in absentia trial is not a
proper alternative to the arrest warrant mechanism. The implemen-
tation of an arrest warrant is a bridge between the pre-trial phase and
trial stage. Until the accused is at large, the pre-trial phase shall
continue. Indeed, there is another argument in favor of the prohibi-
tion of total in absentia trials. It is the responsibility of a court to
make the accused present and, for this reason, criminal courts are
inherently empowered with the power of issuance of an arrest war-
72 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Sixth Annual Report (2014–2015), 35.
73 The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Judgment in the Matter between
National Commissioner of the South Africa Police Service v. Southern African Human
Rights Litigation Centre (485/2012) ZaSCa 168, 27 November 2012, para. 66.
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rant. If a court is authorized to conduct total in absentia trials, it
covers the problem of the weakness of the court to capture the ac-
cused. Courts should be banned from carrying out an in absentia trial
in order to make serious attempts to arrest the accused. In other
words, it must not be ignored, as pointed out by Paulussen with
respect to the ICC, that introducing in absentia trials will run the risk
of masking the real problem, that is that the enforcement arms of the
ICC, formed by States Parties to the Rome Statute, is not functioning
as it should be.74
2.2.2 The Theoretical Perspective
Apart from the practical assessments, the question whether the in-
ternational criminal justice system should be empowered with an
authority to try the accused in his absence could be answered within a
normative framework that is applicable to this system.
2.2.2.1 Consistency with International Human Rights Law. Interna-
tional criminal law grew out of the human rights movement.75 The
emergence of human rightswas of a revolutionary eﬀect and constituted
a paradigm within which the human thoughts have been formed. Hu-
man rights standards are a normative framework within which the le-
gitimacy and thus the possibility of all actions performed by the
international tribunals canbemeasuredagainst, including theholdingof
an in absentia trial. This normative framework could be called the
consistency test.’ For instance, The Rome Statute asserts that the ap-
plication and interpretation of the law must be consistent with inter-
nationally recognized human rights.76 This implies that the Court does
not recognize whatever is inconsistent with human rights norms and
standards. This test governs the whole functioning of the Court.
Whenever the ICCexercises its jurisdictionor it is involved in a case, that
involvement and exercise of jurisdiction have to be applied and inter-
preted in conformity with those internationally recognized human
rights’ relevant to the ICC’s functioning, including theproceedings in the
court room and during the pre-trial phase.77 However, this ruling test
does not only apply to the ICC, but to all other international tribunals,
74 Paulussen, (n 20 above), 1050.
75 M. M. DeGuzman, How Serious Are International Crimes? The Gravity
Problem in International Criminal Law’, (2012) 51(18) Columbian Journal of Tran-
sitional Law 51.
76 Article 21(1)(c) Rome Statute.
77 Paulussen (n 20 above), 1033.
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including the STL. Therefore, the possibility of holding an in absentia
trial must be assessed by the human rights standards.
There is no doubt that the legitimacy of the international criminal
tribunals comes from the manifested fairness of their procedures and
punishments.78 For this purpose, one must lay down an important
normative framework that protects the rights of the accused, namely
the right to a fair trial.’ The fair trial principle is not a single right,
but embraces a wide range of standards such as the right to a fair
hearing, the right to an eﬀective defense and the principle of equality
of arms’ in criminal proceedings. Generally speaking, the right to a
fair trial’ guarantees the right of an accused to participate eﬀectively
in a criminal trial.79 It is the principle of a fair trial’ that functions as
the foundation of international criminal procedure, which provides
coherency and legitimacy to it as a body of international law.80 The
importance of a fair trial is insisted by all tribunals. For instance,
Article 16(2) of the STL Statute states that the accused shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing.’ Cassesse considered the prin-
ciple of a fair trial as a universally accepted principle of international
law that, by now, has belonged to the category of customary norms.81
In addition, the importance of the principle of a fair trial can be
understood by the statement expressed by Chief Prosecutor Jackson
of the Nuremberg IMT who said that history would assess the pro-
ceedings in light of the fairness with which the defendants were
treated.82 It is argued that the international tribunals and courts,
including the ICC, should be more concerned with the appearance of
fairness, because they do have to establish their legitimacy.83
78 D. Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law’, in: S Besson and J. Tasioulas, (eds.), The Philosophy of
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), 579.
79 M. Fedorova, The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal
Proceedings (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2012), 437.
80 G. Boas et al., International Criminal Procedure (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 4.
81 Cassese (n 8 above), 384. This point of view has been acknowledged by the
Court; see e.g.Prosecutor v. Lubanga, (Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M.
Pikis, Decision on the Prosecutors’ Application for Leave to Reply) ICC-01/04-01/
06-424 (12 September 2006), para. 3: The right to a fair trial has been proclaimed as
a legal norm and its incorporation in international instruments denotes compre-
hensive assent to its emergence as a principle of customary international law.’
82 Schabas (n 17 above), 219.
83 Jalloh (n 58 above), 155.
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The right to a fair trial aims at enabling the accused to defend
himself eﬀectively. The right to an eﬀective defense is the cornerstone
of a fair trial. The presence of the accused at trial is desirable because
it is of great beneﬁt for the accused to defend himself eﬀectively.
Regarding the established normative framework, namely the right
to defend eﬀectively, which requires the presence of the accused at
trial, one can readdress the conceptual question about the meaning of
an in absentia trial. The term in absentia trial’ means a trial in which
the accused is not able to defend himself eﬀectively. Therefore, the
requirement of the accused’s presence at trial implies more than his
mere physical presence in the courtroom.84 Indeed, what should be
available is the existence of the possibility in which the accused can
defend himself eﬀectively. For this reason, an ICTY Trial Chamber in
the Strugar case asserted that the prohibition of an in absentia trial
would appear to be void of any substance if it related to the mere
physical presence of the accused in court.’85 There are two situations,
in which the mere physical presence of the accused does not meet the
requirement of a fair trial. It also shows that the ultimate purpose of
the right to be present at trial is enabling the accused to defend
himself eﬀectively. Firstly, when the accused is not in a position to
understand the proceedings due to a lack of knowledge of the oﬃcial
language of the court he will not be able to defend himself. Therefore,
he will be entitled to have a translator. If the accused is not able to
defend eﬀectively, his right is violated, even though his presence is
provided. Indeed, an eﬀective presence’ of the accused is required.
For this reason, according to the Rule 10(c) of the RPE of the STL,
the accused has a right to use his own language and also, in accor-
dance with Rule 65(a)(iii), receive assistance of an interpreter. Se-
condly, when the accused suﬀers from an illness that impairs his
ability to attend trial, the hearing cannot proceed. Rule 135(4) of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC direct the Trial
Chamber to adjourn the proceedings when it is satisﬁed that the
accused is unﬁt to stand trial. Although there is no provision
speciﬁcally addressing the ﬁtness to stand trial in the ICC legal
framework, Pre-Trial Chamber I submitted in its decision on the
ﬁtness of Mr. Gbagbo (Republic of Cote d’Ivoire situation), this
concept must be viewed as an aspect of the broader notion of fair
trial’ and it is an obligation upon the Chamber to ensure, as spelled
84 Schabas (n 17 above), 306.
85 Prosecutor v. Strugar, (Decision of the Defence Motion to Terminate Pro-
ceedings) IT-01-42-T (26 May 2004), para. 32.
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out in rule 135 of the Rules, that proceedings did not take place
against an unﬁt suspect.’86 The exemption for an ill accused to attend
trial is not because of his illness as such, but because it has bad eﬀects
on his eﬀective defense.
2.2.2.2 Common vs. Civil Law Systems. The meaning of the right to
be heard can be understood in the context of two distinct legal tra-
ditions, namely the common’ and civil’ law systems. It must be noted
that Cassese mentioned that neither model can ever be found in its
pure form anywhere and they must be studied as the ideal type’
propounded by Max Weber.87 It is widely accepted, as mentioned
earlier, that the prohibition of the in absentia trial is a feature of the
adversarial/accusatorial’88 system as a legal tradition of the common
law regimes.89 From the perspective of the common law system, a
trial resembles a duel’ between two parties at the trial, namely the
Prosecutor and the defendant. Therefore it requires the presence of
both sides to a proceeding. The logic behind this provision is clear: as
the trial consists of a contest between two parties, no trial properly
may start if one of them is missing.90 Therefore, everyone charged
with a criminal oﬀence has a right to be tried in their presence so that
they can hear and challenge the Prosecutor’s case and present a de-
fense that must be heard. This requirement is reﬂected in the concept
of audi alteram partem’ (literally meaning hear the other side’) as a
rule of natural justice.91
In this context, the principle of equality of arms’ emerges. This
principle is aimed at strengthening an eﬀective defense. An eﬀective
defense must be set as a standard which determines other rights of the
accused to guarantee a fair trial, including the right to self-repre-
86 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, (Decision on the ﬁtness of Laurent Gbagbo to take part
in the proceedings before this Court) ICC-01/11-01/11(2 November 2012), paras. 43
and 56.
87 Cassese (n 8 above), 353.
88 The adversarial element focuses on the responsibility of parties for developing
the legal and factual issues, while the accusatorial element allocates burdens between
parties with respect to the adjudication of guilt. See Cassese (n 8 above), 351.
89 Schabas states that the fact that common law jurisdiction make a number of
exceptions, and allow for trial in absentia where appropriate, shows that this is not an
issue of fundamental values so much as one of diﬀerent practice. See Schabas (n 17
above), 305.
90 Cassese (n 8 above), 370.
91 Legal Digest of an International Fair Trial (Poland: the OSCE Oﬃce for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 2012), 133.
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sentation,’ the right to be represented by counsel of one choice,92 and
the right to receive free legal assistance when the accused cannot
aﬀord the cost of legal aid. These rights keep a fair balance between
the accuser’ and accused’ which is sought by the principle of equality
of arms. This principle implies that the accused may not be put at a
serious procedural disadvantage with respect to the Prosecutor.93 In
fact, the prohibition of hearings in absentia, where only the Prose-
cutor, but not the defendant, is present is a requirement of procedural
equality. Therefore, according to the principle of equality of arms, if
the Prosecutor is present and the accused is absent, there is a viola-
tion of equality of arms.’94
On the contrary, the civil law approach’ tolerates an in absentia
trial to a greater extent. For these jurisdictions there are two argu-
ments in favor of the in absentia trial. At ﬁrst, it has been held that in
the context of the civil law systems the interest of justice may prevail
over the interests of the accused.95 Indeed, all crimes concern and
impact on the public order. The prosecution also represents society
(including the victims) in order to work towards establishing the truth
and justice; it follows that the defendant’s absence from the trial
cannot of itself halt the course of justice.96 However, it does not seem
a totally cogent argument. Justice is done when all interests including
the interest of the accused, are preserved.
The second argument is related to the issue of the truth. The
common law tradition considers the criminal proceedings as a forum
whereby the truth needs to be found and established. In the context of
this system, it is primarily the responsibility of the judges to ﬁnd the
truth.97 Due to the objectivity feature of the truth, the judge can
ascertain the facts even without the presence of the accused. Indeed,
the main distinction between the civil and common law tradition lays
down in their diﬀerent approaches to the notion of truth and the way
in which they deﬁne the truth. The common law approach adopts a
more subjective approach’ to the truth. The truth is not objective but
it is a contextual and phenomenon concept, like what the contrac-
92 Art.14(3)(d) ICCPR.
93 Cassese (n 8 above), 384.
94 Fedorova (n 79 above), 52.
95 See e.g.: B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice?: Victim Participation in In-
ternational Criminal Proceedings (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011), 34–35.
96 Riachy (n 79 above) 1297.
97 Ambos and Bock (n 21 above), 490.
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tualists believe with respect to the moral values.98 This understanding
of the notion of truth requires that the accused be heard because part
of the truth is in his hands and adopting a pluralist approach to the
truth is therefore necessary. It is such a distinction that was described
by former Judge Ro¨ling of the Tokyo IMT as real truth’ and the
trial truth.’99 On the contrary, the civil law tradition deﬁnes the truth
as an absolute and objective concept. Therefore, the presence of the
accused is not necessary, though it is desirable. Indeed, the judge is
able to ﬁnd the truth on his own and he will manage, because he is a
professional person.
Nonetheless, it seems that the civil law approach to the truth is not
all precise. Although the truth is objective, it is not one-sided. On the
contrary, the truth is a plural notion and ﬁnding the truth requires
adopting a plural approach. The truth resembles a shattered mirror;
each part of this unique mirror belongs to someone. These separate
parts should be attached together to ﬁnd and form the truth. Indeed,
you will ﬁnd parts of the truth everywhere and the whole truth no-
where.100 In the context of criminal proceedings, one part of the truth
comes from the accused. He should therefore be heard. The per-
spective of the accused cannot be replaced by the judge’s take on the
events.
2.2.2.3 Waiver of Right to be Present at Trial. The fair trial principle
requires the presence of the accused at trial. The presence at trial as a
right has two implications; ﬁrstly, conducting an in absentia trial is
prohibited because it is a violation of the accused’s right. Secondly,
the accused may waive his right to be present at trial.
Waiving of the right to be present at trial can be done either
explicitly or implicitly. Both kinds of waiver must be free and un-
equivocal and should be done with full knowledge.101 There are some
situations that can be considered as an implied waiver of the right to
be present at trial. Disappearance after the ﬁrst appearance is one of
them. The doctrine of semel preasens simper praesens’ (to be present
98 See: The Search for Truth in Criminal Process, (http://www.cesl.edu.cn/
upload/201209206168631.pdf).
99 B.V.A. Ro¨ling and A. Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reﬂection of a
Peacemonger (Cambridge: Polity, 1992).
100 To study the idea of truth as the shattered mirror, see: A. Appiah, Cos-
mopolitinism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (Issues of Our Time) (New York:
Norton & Company, 2006),13–33.
101 Boas et al. (n 80 above), 237.
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once is to be present always) that is applied by a number of juris-
dictions102 allows trials to continue in case the accused disappears
during the proceedings.103 Here, ﬂeeing could be considered as a
behavior that shows the deliberate waiving of the right to be present
at trial. As mentioned before, some internationalized courts accept
such interpretation of ﬂeeing. However, it seems that in the case in
which the accused is at large and the issued arrest warrant against
him is still pending, adopting such a perception is not accepted.
Nobody can claim that an at large suspect will not intend to defend
himself when he is later arrested. Fleeing does not necessarily imply
that the accused does not intend to defend. As mentioned earlier, the
right to be present at trial refers to the right to defend eﬀectively, not
a mere physical presence at the courtroom. The accused may have
escaped from the courtroom due to a wide range of reasons, but if he
is arrested he will probably defend himself. Anyway, even where one
can characterize such a trial, in which the absconding accused has not
explicitly waived his right to be present, as a fair one, it is still val-
ueless and should be avoided.
With respect to the STL, the status of an in absentia trial before
the STL is not simple. The Statute of the Tribunal includes some
diﬀerent situations. One situation is compatible with the established
human rights standards, where the accused waives his right to be
present at trial. The waiver of right to be present at proceedings
before the Tribunal can be made expressly or implicitly, but it must
be proved. Therefore, Rule 106 of the STL Statute provides that the
tribunal must ensure that all reasonable steps have been taken to
inform the accused and the requirements of Article 22(2) have been
met. On the contrary, other situations, i.e. when the accused has not
been handed over to the Tribunal or has not been found, violate the
right to a fair trial. These hypothetical situations embrace a scenario,
where the accused wants to be present but is not able due to external
limits like being detained at a State. Pons called this scenario the
detention scenario abroad’ and asserts that it is the only situation in
which it is extremely diﬃcult to ﬁnd a convincing lawful basis for an
in absentia trial to be held.104 With respect to ﬂeeing, as mentioned
before, the knowledge of an absconding accused of the charges
102 See, for instance, Article 488 of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code.
103 Jordash and Parker (n 51 above), 494.
104 Pons (n 3 above), 1312.
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against him should not lead to this conclusion that he has waived his
right to defend himself. It is asserted that in case of the accused at
large, a lower threshold may be accepted to determine the actual
knowledge’ that is required to respect the right to notiﬁcation to be
respected.105 Yet such knowledge does not necessarily correspond
with the waiver of the right to be present. On the contrary, to de-
termine the accused’s waiver requires a high evidentiary threshold.
Courts should try to establish their legitimacy by conducting a fair
trial. It is not accepted to replace the failure of the courts to prove
their fairness with in absentia trial. It must be borne in mind that the
process whereby alleged perpetrators of serious crimes are brought to
justice will have a real impact on ending impunity for these crimes. If
the process is viewed as unfair, this perception will create an addi-
tional obstacle to a society transitioning to one characterized by the
rule of law and respect for human rights.106
III PARTIAL IN ABSENTIA TRIALS
Over time the strict approach to in absentia trial has been modiﬁed;
the prohibition of conducting an in absentia trial has remained as a
principle, but with some few exceptions. These exceptions are dis-
cussed in the current section and go under the name of partial in
absentia trial. These exceptions are in consistency with the fair trial
principle, because they include the situations in which the accused’s
waiver of the right to be present is implied. Although the consent of
the accused remains as the key element in order to assess the le-
gitimacy of the absence of the accused, a marginal interpretation has
emerged to deﬁne some behaviors as the implied consent of the ac-
cused not to be present. Indeed, the notion of the fairness has been a
dynamic notion. Mainly, the fairness of proceedings is deﬁned very
strictly and in a one-sided manner; a trial is considered fair if during
the trial all rights of the accused, and only his rights, are respected.
This viewpoint strongly objects that the fair trial notion goes beyond
the accused’s rights. Zappala` asserts that it is not a broad one size ﬁts
105 Ibid., 1315.
106 Human Rights Watch, Letter to the Secretariat of the Rules and Procedure
Committee Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia’, 8, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ﬁles/related_material/Letter%20Cambodia-HRW
ECCC%20Rules%2011.17.06_0.pdf.
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all’ notion.107 Nonetheless, the understanding of the notion of fair-
ness has changed and its scope has broadened over time. This change
is a product of the international tribunals attitude. Many of these
tribunals have recognized that fairness is principally but not solely
owed to the accused and other actors may be regarded as holder of
such rights.108 The broad notion of interest of justice’ is an inter-
changeable concept that is widely used by the ICC to refer to multiple
aspects of fairness. Now, one can asserts that fairness and justice is
not only an accused-oriented notion, but it is a status in which all
interests of diﬀerent parties to a criminal proceeding are respected. A
trial is considered fair and just if there is a reasonable balance be-
tween all interests attendant at trial. This change in the understanding
of the notion of fairness has some practical consequences with respect
to the legitimacy of in absentia trial; it extends the scope of permitted
partial in absentia trials. The presence of the accused at trial is a right,
but the right holder is able to waive such a right. Due to the interest
of other parties to the criminal proceedings, a liberal approach has
been adopted to determine the waiver of a right.
A number of situations in which the accused waives his right to be
present at trial, explicitly or implicitly, is discussed next. These in-
clude: (1) the accused’s disruptive behavior in court; and (2) the ac-
cused’s voluntary absence in court.
3.1 Disruptive Behavior
A ﬁrst scenario that implies a waiver of the right to be present at trial
is the disruptive behavior of the accused in the courtroom, which may
lead to his removal from the courtroom. The Appeals Chamber of the
ICC has mentioned in one of its decisions that the continuously
disruptive behavior of the accused may be construed as an implicit
waiver of his or her right to be present.’109 It is widely believed that if
the accused continues to intentionally disrupt the proceedings while
107 S. Zappala`, The Rights of the Victims v. The Rights of the Accused’, (2010) 8
Journal of International Criminal Justice 137, 149. Also, see: Y. McDermott, Rights
in Reverse: A Critical Analysis of Fair Trial Rights under International Criminal
Law’, in: W. Schabas, Y. McDermott, and N. Hayes (eds.), The Ashgate Research
Companion to International Criminal Law (London: Ashgate, 2013).
108 Friman, Linton et al. (n 68 above), 805.
109 Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, (Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor
against the decision of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled Decision on Mr
Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-01/09-01/11
OA5 (25 October 2013), para. 51.
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he is aware of the consequences of his deed, namely removal from the
trial, it implies that he waives his right to be present at trial. The
situation deﬁned in Article 63(2) of the Rome Statute refers to such
an instance, namely removing the accused from the courtroom by the
Judge because of the accused’s disruption of the trial. According to
this provision, if the accused, being present before the Court, con-
tinues to disrupt the trial, the Trial Chamber may remove the accused
and shall make provision for him or her to observe the trial and
instruct counsel from outside the courtroom, through the use of
communications technology, if required. Such measures shall be
taken only in exceptional circumstances after other reasonable al-
ternatives have proved inadequate, and only for such duration as is
strictly required.’ Indeed, the presence of the accused is the main
principle and the exclusion from the hearings is an exception. Such an
exception should not become the principle and should not be misused
by the Court. As Schabas asserted, the deﬁnition of disruption should
not become a tool to muzzle defendants in circumstances where they
challenge the charges.110 That is why removing the accused must be
used as a last resort. Article 63 of the Rome Statute promulgates that
the accused must continue to disrupt the trial. It means that the
trouble made by the accused must be repetitive and persistent.111 This
condition and threshold must be satisﬁed to ensure that the behavior
of the accused implies his intention to waive his right to be present at
trial. From another perspective, it can be said that the disruptive
defendant is abusing the right to be present at the courtroom.112 It is
accepted that the abuse of a right can lead to the suspension of a
right. Pre-Trial Chamber V(a) of the Court submitted in the Ruto
case that the primary purpose of Article 63(2) is to grant to the Trial
Chamber the power to prevent the accused form exercising what is
also a right, when the accused insists on exercising that right in a
disruptive way.’113
It should be borne in mind that the above-mentioned situation
that justiﬁes a partial in absentia trial is exclusively related to these
cases where the accused is under the control of the court. It does not
include situations in which the accused has not been arrested yet and
110 W. A. Schabas, International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010), 755.
111 Schabas (n 7 above), 307.
112 Jordash and Parker (n 51 above), 490.
113 Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial
(n 40 above), para. 59.
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is at large. There is a strong obligation upon judicial organizations to
arrest and apprehend the person charged in order to prosecute him.
Such organizations are not allowed to evade this responsibility by
conducting an in absentia trial and replacing an imposed counsel on
the accused. If a court is allowed to carry out an in absentia trial,
there is no need any more of police forces and certain coercive
measure to bring suspects to justice.
3.2 Voluntary Absence
When the accused waives his right to be present at the courtroom it
means that there is no ban on holding an in absentia trial anymore,
since such right is not a non-derogable right, but a waivable one. The
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) pointed out in the Mbenge v.
Zaire Communication, regarding Article 14 (3)(d) of the ICCPR:
Indeed, proceedings in absentia are in some circumstances (for in-
stance, when the accused person, although informed of the pro-
ceedings suﬃciently in advance, declines to exercise his right to be
present) permissible in the interest of the proper administration of
justice.’114
To determine whether the accused has waived his right to be
present at trial it must be determined that he has done it deliberately
and on the basis of actual knowledge of the consequences of his
waiver, namely the continuation of the proceedings without his
presence. A court may not commence or proceed with a trial in the
accused’s absence, unless the Prosecutor, who is responsible for the
burden of proving the accused’s knowledge, is able to establish that
the accused possessed the actual knowledge and clearly intended to
waive his right to be present.115 The ECHR, in the case of Somogy v.
Italy, stated: Article 6 of the Convention imposes on every national
court an obligation to check whether the defendant has had the op-
portunity to appraise himself of the proceedings against him.’116 It
implies that there is an evidentiary presumption in favor of the non-
existence of the accused’s intention to waive his right. Therefore, it is
the Prosecutor’s responsibility to prove the accused’s awareness of
and intention to waive his right to be present. As mentioned above,
114 Daniel Monguya Mbenge v. Zaire, Communication No. 16/1977, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40) at 134 (1983).
115 Jordash and Parker (n 51 above), 493.
116 Judgment in case of Somogyi v. Italy, 18 May 2004, European Court of Human
Rights (No. 67972/01), para 72.
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the case of Gbao before the SCSL is an example of an accused’s
voluntary absence’ from the court. The issue of the accused’s vol-
untary absence from court proceedings triggered an intense debate at
the ICC, which is the subject of discussion in the next subparagraph.
3.2.1 The ICC
The issue of partial in absentia trials has had a colorful history in the
context of the ICC. This history goes back to 2013, when the Court in
the Kenya situation was faced with some novel requests from the
Ruto and Kenyatta Defence teams to compel the Court to excuse
their clients from constant presence in the courtroom. Although the
prohibition of total in absentia trials is an established rule in the ICC
legal system, the possibility of conducting partial in absentia trials
had not been laid down in the ICC legal framework. It is, however,
obvious that the Rome Statute is not an exhaustive legal text, because
in 1998 the delegates to the Rome Conference were not able to predict
everything that could possibly happen in the future. As Singh ob-
served: it is impossible even for the most imaginative legislature to
forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that may emerge
after enacting a statute where its application may be called for.’117
Judicial interpretation of the Statute’s provisions may therefore be
called for, in light of developments, insights and needs over time.
That is why Bennion, a British barrister, submitted that a court has a
certain degree of delegated legislative power.’118
3.2.1.1 Developments in the Ruto and Kenyatta Cases. Before legally
analyzing the developments in the cases concerning Ruto and
Kenyatta relating to in absentia, an overview of the earlier develop-
ments in these cases are given ﬁrst. On 26 November 2009, the ICC
Prosecutor requested authorization to open an investigation in rela-
tion to crimes allegedly committed during the 2007–2008 post-elec-
tion violence in Kenya in which hundreds of people were killed.119 On
31 March 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II authorized the Prosecutor to
117 P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 8th Edn (India: Wadhwa & Co,
2001), 45.
118 F.A.R. Bennion, Bennion onStatutory Interpretation, 5th edn (London: Lex-
isNexis, 2008), 470.
119 On 15 March 2005, Kenya ratiﬁed the Rome Statute, allowing the Court
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed by
Kenyan nationals or on Kenyan territory after 1 July 2002, the date the Rome
Statute entered into force.
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open an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity commit-
ted between 1 June 2002 (the date of the Rome Statute’s entry into
force for Kenya) and 26 November 2009 (the date the Prosecutor ﬁled
the request for authorization to start an investigation) in Kenya.120
On 8 March 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber II summoned – as an alter-
native to issuing arrest warrants – three suspects, including Uhuru
Muigai Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto, to appear before the
Court, because it found reasonable grounds to believe that they
committed the crimes alleged by the Prosecutor.121 On 7 and 8 April
2011, Ruto and Kenyatta, respectively, made their initial appearance
before the Court in The Hague. The charges against the two accused
were subsequently conﬁrmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.122 On 9 July
2012, Trial Chamber V, that is dealing with these cases, set the dates
for the commencement of the trials of Ruto and Kenyatta, for 10 and
11 April 2013, respectively.123
Nonetheless, before the opening of the trial, a signiﬁcant event
happened. Ruto and Kenyatta were elected as Deputy President and
President of Kenya, respectively. This momentous turn of events in
their circumstances gave rise to a request to the Chambers by their
Defense lawyers to excuse Ruto and Kenyatta from their continuous
presence in the courtroom. This request, at ﬁrst, was made by Ruto’s
Defense in April 2013 and then followed by Kenyatta’s in September
2013.124 Both requests were conditionally granted by Chambers
V(a) (forRuto) andV(b) (forKenyatta).More precisely, theChambers
120 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya) ICC-01-09/19 (31 March 2010).
121 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, (Decision on the Prosecutor Application for
Summons to Appear For William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kosgey and Arap Sang)
ICC-01/09-01/11 (8 March 2011).
122 Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kusgey and Sang, (Decision on the Conﬁrmation of
Charges pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) ICC-01/09-02/
11(23 January 2012), and Prosecutor v. Kenyatta and Hussein Ali, (Decision on the
Conﬁrmation of Charges pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute)
ICC-01/09-02/11 (23 January 2012).
123 Prosecutor v.Kenyatta, (Decision on the Schedule Leading up to Trial) ICC-01/
09-01/11(9 July 2012), and Prosecutor v. Ruto and Arap Sang, (Decision on the
Schedule Leading up to Trial) ICC-01/09-01/11 (9 July 2012).
124 Prosecutor v. Ruto and Arap Sang, (Defense Request Pursuant to Article 63(1)
of the Rome Statute) ICC-01/09-01/11-685 (17 April 2013); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta,
(Defense Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-
01/09-02/11 (23 September 2013).
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obliged Ruto and Kenyatta to physically attend the proceedings in the
courtroom, but only for some important hearings, such as during the
opening and closing statements and for any other attendance directed
by the Chamber.’125 The Chamber’s decision as to Ruto’s excusal was
objected by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor thus appealed against the
Chamber’s decision in favor of Ruto’s request on the basis of two
issues: Is Rule 134quater, as interpreted by the Chamber when granting
an conditional excusal to Mr. Ruto, consistent with Articles 63(1),
21(3) and 27(1) of the Rome Statute; and if so, does it on its own terms
permit theChamber to conditionally excuseMr. Ruto frompresence at
trial subject to the conditions in paragraph 79 of the Chamber’s written
reasons.126 Then, on 25 October 2013, the Appeal Chamber reversed
the impugned decision. The reason behind the judgment was that in the
eyes of the Appeal Chamber the Trial Chamber had interpreted the
scope of its discretion to excuse the accused from the presence at the
courtroom too broadly and eﬀectively making his absence the general
rule and his presence an exception.’127 The Prosecution subsequently
also addressed the granted excusal to Kenyatta and requested Trial
Chamber V(b) to reconsider its diction on Kenyatta’s excusal.128
Therefore, the Chamber reconsidered its decision by reference to the
similarity between the reasoningunderlying both decisions ofRuto and
Kenyatta’s requests to be excused. It concluded that Mr.Kenyattawill
therefore as a general rule have to be present for his trial,’ but any
further requests by him to be excused from attending parts of the trial
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.’129
The success of the Prosecutor to alter the situation against the
acting heads of Kenya did not put an end to this story. Kenya took
advantage of the twelfth session of the Assembly of States Parties
(ASP) to the ICC which was held in November 2013. Inﬂuenced by
125 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal form Continuous Presence at
Trial (n 137 above).
126 Prosecutor v. Ruto and Arap Sang, (Prosecution’s Application for Leave to
Appeal the Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence
at Trial) ICC-01/09-01/11 (24 February 2014), para. 1.
127 Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial
Chamber V(a) on 18 June 2013 entitled Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from
Continuous Presence at Trial’ (n 109 above), para. 63.
128 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, (Prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration of the De-
cision on Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at
Trial’ and in the Alternative Application for Leave to Appeal) ICC-01/09-02/11-837
(28 October 2013).
129 Ibid., para. 16.
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Kenya and the support from other delegates of State Parties, the ASP
adopted Rule134quater by consensus and two other amendments to
the RPE, addressing the meaning, scope and application of Article
63(1), namely Rules 134bis and 134ter.130 These amendments and
incorporations are prominent episodes in the life of the ICC. Rules
134bis and 134ter contain lenient policies to encourage the persons
charged by the ICC to attend before the Court voluntarily, because
they address only the summoned accused and do not include those
who are under an arrest warrant. Rule 134bis provides that an ac-
cused can be present through video technology upon application to
and at the discretion of the Trial Chamber. This Rule reads 1. An
accused subject to a summons to appear may submit a written request
to the Trial Chamber to be allowed to be present through the use of
video technology during part or parts of his or her trial.’ It means
that in the eyes of the Court, as discussed before, the in absentia trial
is not necessarily related to the accused’s mere physical presence in
the courtroom. It rather refers to what had already been accepted by
the STL: Rule 104 of the STL RPE states: Proceedings shall not be in
absentia if an accused appears before the Tribunal in person, by vi-
deo-conference or by counsel appointed or accepted by him.’ Also,
Rule 134ter sets out the principles and procedures governing a Trial
Chamber to exercise its discretion where the accused requests excusal
from the presence in a part or parts of the proceedings on the basis of
exceptional circumstances’ that justify such an absence. To grant
such a request, in accordance with Rule 134ter, the Trial Chamber
shall be satisﬁed that alternative measures, including changes to the
trial schedule or a short adjournment would be inadequate,’ the
accused has explicitly waived his or her right to be present at trial’
and the rights of the accused will be fully ensured in his or her
absence.’ Rule 134ter(3) reaﬃrms that an exemption is an exception
and any absence must not become the rule.’ Besides this Rule, the
ASP expressed its consensus view through Rule 134quater that the
accused persons who are mandated to fulﬁll extraordinary public
duties at the highest national level’ can submit a written request to the
Trial Chamber to be excused and be represented by counsel only,
their request should be granted where it is in the interest of justice.
These two rules share a substantive feature and that is that any ex-
cusal from the presence at trial should be an exception and not a rule
and should be justiﬁed on the basis of the existence of exceptional
130 See ICC Assembly of States Parties Resolution (ASP/12/Res.7), adopted on 27
November 2013 at 12th Plenary Meeting.
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circumstances. However, from an evidentiary perspective, there is a
prominent distinction between these rules. Undertaking extraordi-
nary public duties is presumed as such exceptional circumstances; it
means that there is an evidentiary presumption in favor of those
defendants who are undergoing extraordinary public duties at their
countries that exempt them from proving that their situation is ex-
ceptional. This thus means that the amended rules draw a distinction
between diﬀerent defendants on the basis of their public status.
Subsequent to these amendments, in the last days of 2013, the
Defense of Ruto submitted a request to excuse himself from atten-
dance at trial, not just a partial excusal but rather a blanket ex-
cusal.131 In light of this request, on 15 January 2014, pursuant to
Chamber V(a)’s order, a status conference’ was held to discuss the
request and other matters related to the trial proceedings. During the
status conference, the Chamber, by oral ruling, decided to condi-
tionally excuse Mr. Ruto from being present at trial. Afterwards, on
18 February 2014, the Chamber issued the written reasons beyond its
oral ruling.132 The Chamber had assessed all legal requirements in
accordance with Rule 134quater and came to the conclusion that they
all were met and therefore had granted Ruto a conditional refusal. As
to the nature of the oﬃcial status of the accused, the Chamber sub-
mitted that although it agreed that not every duty at the highest
national level is an extraordinary one’,133 the Chamber is of the view
that when it is reasonably expected, based on the Constitution of
Kenya, that the accused is highly likely to be frequently required to
fulﬁll extraordinary duties at the highest national level, the proper
accommodation of these duties is to excuse him from presence at
trial, but with limitations. Indeed, such was the intention of the ASP,
which consciously omitted from Rule 134quater of the Rules the
requirement of a case-by-case ruling.’134
Nonetheless, the Chamber avoided granting an unconditional
excusal, because in the eyes of the Chamber such an unconditional
excusal is incompatible with the interest of justice. The interest of
131 Prosecutor v. Ruto and Arap Sang, (Defense Request pursuant to Article 63(1)
of the Rome Statute and Rule 134quater of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to
excuse Mr. William Samoei Ruto from Attendance at Trial) ICC-01/09-01/1116 (16
December 2013).
132 Prosecutor v. Ruto and Arap Sang, (Reasons for the Decision on Excusal from
the Presence at Trial under Rule 134quater) ICC-01-09-01/011 (18 February 2014).
133 Ibid., para. 64.
134 Ibid., para. 65.
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justice is a compound notion, encompassing diﬀerent interests, such
as the interest of the Court, the interest of the victims, the interest of
the accused and the interest of the international community. That is
why the Chamber has to keep a balance between these distinct in-
terests to satisfy the interest of justice requirement. In the words of
the Chamber: The Chamber is of the view that the continuous ab-
sence of Mr Ruto throughout the entire remainder of the trial may
indeed be incompatible with the interests of justice, given the active
participation of victims in the proceedings. The Chamber is thus
persuaded that limitations, listed in the Oral Ruling, should attach to
the excusal in order to minimize the adverse eﬀects which the absence
of the accused may produce.’135 On the basis of adopting such an
approach, the Chamber decided to conditionally excuse Mr Ruto
from presence at trial pursuant to Rule 134quater of the Rules.’
Upon the achievements gained by Ruto’s Counsel, the Defense for
Kenyatta ﬁled a request before the Court to excuse Kenyatta pur-
suant to Rule 134quater from attending the status conference that
had already been scheduled for 8 October 2014 to discuss cooperation
matters between the ICC and Kenya.136 However, this request was
not granted by the Court and it announced that Kenyatta would need
to be present at the status conference.137 Therefore, in October 2014,
Kenyatta became the ﬁrst acting head of state who appeared before
the ICC. However, due to a lack of evidence against the accused,
which – according to the Prosecutor – was due to non-cooperation by
the Kenyan government to investigate the crimes and unwillingness
of witnesses to testify in court due to witness interference, the
Prosecutor had to decide, pressured by the Court, to withdraw the
charges against Kenyatta. Therefore, the case was closed in Decem-
ber 2014,138 which led to a lot of critique from diﬀerent corners,
135 Ibid., para. 74. See also on this issue: A. Knottnerus, The International
Criminal Court on Presence at Trial: the (in)validity of Rule 134quater’, Interna-
tional Crimes Database, Brief 5, September 2014.
136 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, (Defence Request for Excusal from Attendance pur-
suant to Rule 134 quater or to Adjourn the Status Conference Scheduled for 8
October 2014 and Permit Mr Kenyatta to Attend on a Rescheduled Date by Means
of Video-link pursuant to Rule 134 bis) ICC-01/09/-02/11 (25 September 2014).
137 See http://www.icc.cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
Pages/ma166.aspx.
138 According to the Prosecutor, the withdrawal of the charges does not mean that
the case has been permanently terminated. The case can be re-opened, or brought in
a diﬀerent form, if new evidence establishing the crimes and his responsibility for
them is discovered. See: ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International
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saying that the Court should have referred the matter to the ASP to
address the non-cooperation issue.139 Now, in the eyes of the critics,
the wrong message has been given to States (we will not prosecute
when there is no cooperation) and victims of the crimes are the ones
mostly aﬀected without any form of justice.140
3.2.1.2 Analysis of the Ruto and Kenyatta Cases. How can one
evaluate the above developments in the Ruto and Kenyatta cases in
light of the issue of partial in absentia trials? As set out before, there
are a set of provisions governing the issue of the presence of the
accused in the courtroom in the ICC legal system, namely Articles
63(1), 67(1)(d) and 64(2) of the Rome Statute and Rules 134ter,
134bis and 134quater of the ICC RPE. There is a need for adopting a
holistic approach when interpreting these provisions; in other words,
the Rome Statute must be read as a whole. This kind of interpretative
approach is accepted by the International Court of Justice in one of
its advisory opinions: It is obvious that the Treaty must be read as a
whole and that its meaning is not to be determined merely upon
particular phrases which, if detached from the context, may be in-
terpreted in more than one sense.’141 With respect to the ICC, this
interpretative approach means that each provision and part of the
Rome Statute must be read and construed in light of other provisions
and parts of the Statute in a manner that does not make them con-
tradictory, redundant or inconsistent with each other in the context
of the Statute.
It is indisputable that the presence of the accused at trial is a right,
which is accorded to the accused by the Rome Statute as laid down in
Article 67(1)(d) and as discussed in previous sections. One of the
major features of a right is that the right holder is able to waive his
right. It is the distinction between rights and obligations. This feature
of the right to be present was controversial in the Ruto and Kenyatta
Footnote 138 continued
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the withdrawal of charges against Mr. Uhuru
Muigai Kenyatta’, 5 December 2014.
139 See e.g.: Redress, President Kenyatta ICC Case: Kenyan Government Should
Account for Impeding Access to Justice and Truth for Thousands of Victims of the
Post-Election Violence’, 4 December 2014.
140 Ibid.
141 Advisory Opinion on Competence of the ILO in regard to International
Regulation of the Conditions of the Labor of Persons Employed in Agriculture, 12
August 1922, ICJ (Series B, No 2), 23.
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cases. The Ruto defense believed that their client had an authority to
waive his right. They argued that the presence at trial is merely a right
of the accused. On the basis of this argument, they requested the
Chamber to excuse Ruto from attending his hearings. However, this
viewpoint is not accepted by adopting a holistic approach to the
Statute. Besides Article 67(1)(d), there is another provision in the
Rome Statute that must be considered, namely Article 63(1), ac-
cording to which the accused shall be present during the trial.’ The
defense claimed that the latter right only reaﬃrms the right of the
accused to be present, enshrined in Article 67(1)(d) of the Rome
Statute.142 Yet, if there was a similarity between both Articles it
would result in redundancy of one of them. It is obvious that such a
result is not accepted, especially in the context of the Rome Statute,
which must be as comprehensive as possible, because it is a legal text
of a permanent institution. Indeed, there is no room for redundancy
and repetition. The counsel’s viewpoint drew the same criticism from
the Trial Chamber.143 In the eyes of the Chamber Article 63(1) of the
Rome Statute contains an issue, independent from the content of
Article 67(1)(d).
What does Article 63 of the Rome Statute imply? Article 63(1)
provides that there is an obligation upon the accused to be present at
trial. In fact, the presence of the accused at trial is both his right and
his obligation. For this reason, the accused is not allowed or entitled
to waive his right and become absent at trial only on his own will.
Presence at trial is not a mere right, but it is a hybrid one. In fact, it is
a coin with two sides; from one side it is a right, enshrined in Article
67(1)(d), and from the other side it is an obligation, set out in Article
63(1). Article 63(1) has a normative language; it uses the word shall’
and it clearly implies an obligation
Each obligation must be justiﬁed and have a solid basis. The duty
to be present at the court is derived from the authority of a court to
have judicial control’ over the case being tried.144 Each court has an
implied power to impose restrictions on the whereabouts and time of
the accused, who is under investigation of that court. Without such a
power, a court is not able to proceed with its investigations. The
functional necessity’ doctrine also supports this authority of courts.
142 Defense Request Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute (n 124 above),
para. 5.
143 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at
Trial (n 40 above), para. 39.
144 Ibid., para. 42.
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The functional necessity concept asserts that an entity shall be enti-
tled to do what is strictly necessary for the exercise of its functions in
the fulﬁllment of its purpose.145 From such a perspective, one can
asserts that the court is empowered with such an authority.
It was mentioned that Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute contains
an obligation imposed on the accused. Now a question arises whe-
ther the scope of this obligation is limited only to the accused’? In the
Ruto case, the Prosecution asserted that the scope of this obligation
goes beyond the accused and embraces the Court as well. The exis-
tence of such an obligation implies that the Court has not got any
discretion to excuse the accused from the presence in the courtroom;
even the accused waives his right to be present. On the basis of this
claim, the Prosecutor appealed against the Trial Chamber decision in
favor of Ruto’s request to be excused from the continuous presence.
However, this assertion was not accepted by the Appeal Chamber.
The Appeal Chamber found in its judgment of 25 October 2013 that
article 63(1) of the Statute does not operate as an absolute bar in all
circumstances to the continuation of trial proceedings in the absence
of the accused.’146 There are some reasons supporting the non-exis-
tence of such an obligation upon the Court. Firstly, as mentioned
above, the basis of the obligation arising from Article 63(1) is the idea
of judicial control.’ This justiﬁcation is only related to the accused.
Secondly, if the drafters of the Statute intended to impose this obli-
gation they could use a diﬀerent language for Article 63(1) and
worded it in the prohibitory model, like Rule 60(1) of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone which
provides that an accused may not be tried in his absence.’ Lastly, the
Trial Chamber argued that an interpretation that imposes the duty on
the Chamber fosters the judicial ineﬃciency by constraining the
Chamber to stop the trial on every occasion that the accused is unable
with good reason to be present during the trial although he consents
that the trial may proceed in his absence.’147 The Chamber adduced
145 P.H.F. Bekker, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organizations: A
Functional Necessity Analysis of Their Legal Status and Immunities (Leiden: Brill,
1994), 39.
146 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against decision of trial Chamber
V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled Decision on Mr. Ruto’s request for Excusal from
Continuous Presence at Trial’ (n 109 above), para. 55.
147 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at
Trial (n 40 above), para. 44.
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the Bemba case in which his trial continued while he was absent from
it for some hours due to his health conditions.148
Hence, the presence at trial has got a twofold nature. From one
side, it is a right of the accused, which prohibits the holding of in
absentia trials. From the other side, it is an obligation upon the ac-
cused, which obliges him to be present at trial, even though he waives
his right to be present. This mixed nature leads to the following
consequences: the accused is not allowed to be absent at trial by
waiving his right, unless the Court accepts his request. And also, the
Court it is not allowed to hold an in absentia trial unless the accused
explicitly waives his right to be present. This complex interaction
between the right of the accused and the discretion of the court is well
enshrined in the recent amendments. According to the amendments,
the Trial Chamber of the Court has discretion to excuse the accused
from part of his trial; the existence of an explicit waiver of right to be
present is a prerequisite for exercising of such discretion.
Furthermore, the Counsel for Mr. Ruto, as part of the oral sub-
mission in support of his application, argued that one reason that
recommended the excusal he sought for his client was that it will
generate judicial precedent that will make it easier in the future for
leaders of states to stand trial before this court while still fulﬁlling
their obligations of governance at home.’149 Although the Trial
Chamber rejected this normative argument, this argument provided a
context for the amendments to the Rules.
What happened in the Ruto case exempliﬁes the dilemma of co-
operation versus justice.’ Although the judicial pillar of the Court,
namely its Chambers, consider the issue of the accused’s presence in
the courtroom from the perspective of justice and for that reason laid
a high threshold which did not include the duties and positions of the
acting head of states, the cooperation and external pillar of the court,
namely the ASP amended the Rules in accordance with the real facts
on the ground, justifying giving priority to the cooperation issue.
From this perspective, the ASP obliges the Chambers of the Court to
grant the excusal request from the accused who are acting in high
national level state positions to receive cooperation from states and
encourage the defendants to cooperate with the Court.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., para. 29.
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IV FINAL REMARKS
Coming back to this contribution’s main question on the permis-
sibility of total and partial in absentia trials before international
criminal tribunals it is submitted that, by making a conceptual
distinction between diﬀerent types of in absentia trials, total in
absentia trials should be prohibited in international criminal law,
whereas partial in absentia trials can be accepted in certain cir-
cumstances.
From a practical and normative perspective total in absentia
trials should be prohibited. Total in absentia trials imply that the
outcome of such trials are not enforceable on the accused due to
his absence. In addition, in the case of total in absentia trials a re-
trial would be necessary if the accused is later apprehended. In
such a situation, in absentia trials can be seen as time and money
consuming mechanisms. Furthermore, when assessing the in ab-
sentia trials in light of the human rights standards, such as the
accused’s right to a fair trial, the same conclusion must be reached.
However, this conclusion does not leave aside the option for in-
ternational criminal tribunals to opt for procedures in absentia
along the lines of Rule 61 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE and Article 61
of the Rome Statute. These are pre-trial mechanisms that oﬀer
various advantages in the absence of total in absentia trials proper,
including giving victims of international crimes the opportunity to
participate and testify in court.
On the contrary, partial in absentia trials could be accepted in
some circumstances, including where the accused displays disruptive
behavior in the courtroom or is voluntarily absent. In these situa-
tions, the fair trial principle is not necessarily violated. The presence
of the accused at the criminal proceeding is far and foremost a right
of the accused. Yet, being a right, the presence at trial is derogable.
Therefore, if the accused continuously disrupts the proceedings or
voluntarily chooses to be absent, the court has discretion to excuse
the accused from presence at trial in exceptional circumstances. In the
eyes of the ICC, executing extraordinary sovereign functions is an
example of such circumstances, which, however, provides the accused
a big advantage: the accused does not have the burden of proving
that his situation is exceptional. This can be interpreted as a privilege
that is given by the Court to defendants who are in the highest state
positions within their country while encouraging the accused to co-
operate with the Court. This is a very far-reaching rule and, as seen in
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the Kenyatta case, did not lead to the accused’s cooperation with the
Court. The Court should be vigilant when it comes to determining
whether a voluntary absence’ situation is an exception to the rule (to
be present at trial) and not treat categories of defendants diﬀerently.
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